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Abstract 
This research moves beyond traditional ratio analysis to find out the possibility of bankruptcy and financial 
statement fraud at AngloGold Ashanti (AGA). An examination of the financial statements of the company for 
the years 2010 to 2012 was made with the use of Modified Altman and Beneish models. The modified Altman 
model is a predictor of bankruptcy. To discover the possibility of financial statement fraud, this research used the 
Beneish model. The examination of AGA’s financial reports with the Beneish model revealed the company was 
not engaged in financial statement fraud. The Altman model on the other hand, brought to the fore the financial 
distress the firm went through in the years under review. 
Keywords: Altman Z Score, Beneish M-Score, Fraud, Bankruptcy, Internal Control Systems                                 
 
1. Introduction 
According to a 2012 report by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), there are three main types 
of fraud that are committed within corporate circles. They are Financial Statement Misrepresentation 1 , 
Corruption 2and Asset Misappropriation3. According to the same report, Financial Statement Misrepresentation 
represents 7.2% of all fraud cases.  On average, an organization loses 5% of its revenue to fraud and this 
translates to $3.5 trillion per year globally (ACFE, 2012).   
Louwers et al.(2007) state that fraud involves knowingly misrepresenting facts with the ultimate aim of cajoling 
the user of information to believe the falsehood. In the opinion of Louwers et al.(2007),  financial fraud could 
lead users of financial information to make wrong decisions that could ultimately harm an economy. Corporate 
executives are motivated to engage in fraud for different reasons. Beasley et al. (1999) cites zeal to shore up 
financial results; a propensity to sustain a high stock price 4and a push to hide personal gain as a result of asset 
misappropriation as some of the factors that lead executives to commit fraud.  
Isa (2011) argues that motivation aside; there are internal factors in corporations that assist executives to engage 
in fraudulent activities. Weak internal control systems and flexibility of accounting are some of those factors 
captured by Isa (2011). The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners posits that financial fraud more often than 
not occurs with management’s knowledge (ACFE, 1993). This can especially happen when weak internal 
controls and other corporate weaknesses are at play. Beasley (1996), Carcello and Nagy (2004) all conclude that 
proper corporate governance characteristics can minimize the occurrence of financial statement misreporting. 
Proper corporate governance measures should necessarily encompass a check on related party transactions5. As 
Dunn (1999) found out, the history of previous financial statement fraud aside, related party transactions make a 
firm susceptible to issuing fraudulent financial reports. Related party transactions according to Dunn (1999) can 
lead to fraud because there is the possibility that a transaction will not attract a fair value. Impropriety emanating 
from such transactions is manifest in the fraud that was perpetrated by Enron Corp. (Hasnan, Rahman, 
Mahenthiran, 2008). 
There is a theory that seeks to link economic situation of a firm and unethical practices such as financial 
statement misrepresentation. As concluded by Bell et al. (1991), a financially distressed organization with 
unethical managers can seek to improve their financial position, albeit artificially, through fraudulently generated 
financial statements. Financial statement fraud is not the only way a firm can engage in corporate fraud. Asset 
                                                                 
1 Financial Statement Fraud is the intentional misrepresentation of material information in financial reports (ACFE,2012) 
2 Corruption as defined by Myint (2000) as the use of public office for private gain. Bribery, embezzlement, nepotism, 
extortion are examples of corruption. 
3 Asset misappropriation referes to the type of fraud in which one steals or misuses an organizations resources (Albrect et 
al.,2008) 
4 Allen & Gale (1990) report that the Securities and Exchange Commission Act of 1934 which made it illegal for corporate 
executives to engage in shortselling and issue false information has reduced the possibilities of manipulating stock prices. 
5 Johnstone & Bedard(2004) contend that related party transactions are difficult to audit and it is an indicator of audit risk. 
The General Accounting Office in a 2003 report has it that, related party transactions is one of the major corporate practices 
that leads companies to misrepresent financial statements. 
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misappropriation and corruption also constitute fraud (ACFE, 2012). 
Asset Misappropriation as indicated by Albrect et al. (2008) can be divided into the theft of cash and theft of 
non-cash assets. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners reports that 85% of asset misappropriation cases 
involve the dishonest use of cash (ACFE, 2012). According to a KPMG (2004) report, asset misappropriation 
most times occurs when organizations have weak internal controls. In the words of Albrect et al. (2008), weak 
internal controls 1include improper documentation and bad record keeping2, lack of physical safeguards and 
having more than one person complete a task. Holtfreter (2004) underlines the importance of having a good 
system of internal controls when he concluded that an organization could forestall the occurrence of asset 
misappropriation by institutionalizing strong internal control mechanisms. 
Corruption as noted by Myint (2000), festers when there is a lack of transparency and accountability. On account 
of corruption, business organizations and governments have fallen (Myint, 2000). Corruption has a dire 
consequence for any nation’s economy. In a survey of 150 public officials from 60 countries conducted by Gray 
and Kaufmann (1998), many respondents decried corruption as an obstacle to economic development. In general, 
fraud has a negative impact on an economy. As Isa (2011) points out, false financial information has the 
potential of leading investors astray to invest in unprofitable areas in the economy. Corruption as indicated by 
Myint (2000) leads to wastage, inequity and social decay, which are all features of bad economies. 
1.1 History and Current Issues 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005) in an economic crime survey has it that the number of companies reporting 
financial misrepresentation has increased by 140% globally. There has also been a 71% increase in the number 
of companies reporting corruption. These overwhelming statistics notwithstanding, nearly 80% of companies 
globally do not conceive it possible that their firms will ever suffer fraud (Kroll, 2011). 
The profile of fraud companies has been diverse over the years. Beasley et al. (2010) reports that companies that 
engaged in fraud were start ups that had no assets or revenues through to big organizations that commanded 
more than $400 billion in assets. In the same vein, fraud historically can exist across all industries (Beasley et al. 
2010). Examples of corporate fraud as enumerated by Kroll (2011) featured Enron and WorldCom companies. 
Enron hid $3.1 billion debts whilst WorldCom overstated profits by categorizing operating expenses as capital 
expenditures. Companies such as Tyco International, AOL Time Warner and Bristol-Myers Squibb all engaged 
in the act of corporate fraud (Kroll, 2011).  
Fraud is not confined to only US based companies. The Indian IT giant, Satyman Computer Services engaged in 
fraudulent activities such as forgery, income manipulation3 and asset stripping4 on a scale twice as big as 
Enron’s. 
In the American situation, there was a legislative response leading to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2012 (Kroll, 2011). Deloitte (2008) though reports a preponderance of fraud in the midst of the tight legal 
environment. In the immediate aftermath of the coming into being of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United 
States, many firms have formulated highly leveraged balance sheets with huge debts underneath (Deloitte, 2008). 
Highly leveraged firms may face bankruptcy if they are unable to meet repayment schedules, though it may also 
increase shareholder Return on Investments.  
In the report of Deloite (2008), fraud and bankruptcy are listed as bedfellows. Bankrupt companies, or firms 
close to it, are more likely to engage in corporate fraud including financial statement fraud. Specifically, 
bankrupt companies are 300% more likely than healthy companies to receive a financial statement fraud AAER5 
by the SEC in the United States of America. In the same vein, companies charged with fraud are more likely to 
file for bankruptcy (Deloitte, 2008). Between 2002 and 2005, not less than 10% of all bankrupt companies were 
issued with financial statement fraud AAER. It was highest in 2003 at 16% of all bankrupt companies (Deloitte, 
2008). Dunn (1999) found that a good number of bankrupt companies have fraud schemes in their history. 
According to Beasley et al. (2010), in the period between 1998 to 2007, about 300 fraud cases were recorded 
with a total cumulative financial statement misrepresentation of $120 billion. 
 
                                                                 
1 Doyle et al.(2007) report that firms that are younger, financially weaker, complex and rapidly growing are more likely to 
have weak internal control systems. 
2   Electronic record keeping such as computerized accounting systems is recognized by the Center for Tax Policy 
Administration of the OECD as an internal control measure. As stated by the OECD (2003), safeguarding assets and 
reporting transactions correctly are symptomatic of good record keeping practices. 
3 Rangan (1998), Shivakumar (2000) demonstrate that firms manipulate earnings when they are about to issue equity and 
they do so to increase shareholder value. 
4 Asset stripping is when firms or their executives purchase undervalued companies before selling them off to make profits. 
As argued by Campos et al.(2005), it is driven in part by the firms potential profitability. 
5  Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases from the United States SEC . 
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1.2 Environmental Statement 
Kroger (2004) indicates that America has since the 1930’s relied on a complex private-public system of checks 
to deter executives of companies from misleading investors. The complex regime to prevent fraud has four layers 
of institutions: Independent auditors, corporate board of directors, private securities analysts and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC). This is the same in Ghana where there is an SEC that acts to ultimately 
protect investors. The danger of fraud is well documented. ACFE (2012) argues that fraud can destroy 
companies. Precision Machinery and Instrument manufacturer, Olympus lost $3 billion in market capitalization a 
few days after news of a potential fraud scandal was made public. Beasley (et al., 2010) reports that companies 
engaged in fraud often experience bankruptcy and a delisting from the stock market. 
The long term negative effects, as enumerated above are quite apparent. Recent fraud scandals and their 
attendant consequences have made Chief Financial Officers relatively hesitant in employing accounting 
manipulations in managing earnings (Jensen, 2011). The fact that global fraud was historically exacerbated by a 
situation of inadequate rules and regulations has been well documented. Though not completely erasing fraud, 
the promulgation of new regulations in many jurisdictions across the world is helping to stem the tide. However, 
the Economist (2000) suggests that the remedy for fraud is disclosure, honest accounting and vigilance from 
shareholders. 
 
2.0 Discussion of the Facts 
This paper utilized the Modified Altman Z score model to determine if potential bankruptcy signals could be 
detected. An analysis of the quality of the company’s reported earnings was then made by utilizing the Beneish 
M-Score model. 
2.1 Altman’s Discriminant Function Algorithm 
The modified Altman discriminant function Z”=6.5X1 + 3.2X2 + 6.7X3+ 1.05X4 was utilized to ascertain whether 
or not bankruptcy was imminent. The indices are defined thus: 
X1= Working Capital / Total Assets 
X2= Retained Earnings / Total Assets 
X3= Earnings before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets 
X4= Market Value of Equity / Book Value of Total Liabilities 
Z= Overall Index 
According to Altman (2000), the indices are significant for the following reasons: 
X1--- This index measures the net liquid assets of the firm in relation to total capitalization. A distressed firm 
will hold a shrinking portfolio of current assets and therefore lower capital, which translates to a low index. 
X2--- This index measures leverage of a firm. A high index is indicative of a firm that has financed its operations 
through retention of profits.  
X3--- This index measures asset productivity without taking into cognizance interest and tax 
X4--- This measures how a firm’s assets decline in value before it goes insolvent 
Altman (2000) indicates that firms that have a Z” score of more than 2.6 are considered safe and unlikely to go 
bankrupt. A Z” score between 1.1 and 2.6 is indicative of a firm whose potential bankruptcy cannot easily be 
predicted. It is thus termed to be in the grey area. A less than 1.1 Z” score signifies a likelihood of bankruptcy. 
Zones of discrimination as postulated by Altman (2000) are summarized thus: 
Z > 2.6—Safe zone 
1.1 < Z < 2.6—Grey zone 
Z” < 1.1—Distress zone 
The Z score for AngloGold Ashanti was calculated for the years 2010 to 2012. 
TABLE 1—Analyzing AngloGold Ashanti with the Use of the Modified Altman Model 
INDEX 2010 2011 2012 
X1 0.079 0.128 0.057 
X2 (0.277) (0.131) (0.102) 
X3 0.042 0.183 0.092 
X4 0.759 0.917 0.757 
Z” 0.20 2.61 1.41 
 
2.2 Analyzing the Quality of AGA’s Reported Earnings by Utilizing the Beneish M-Score Model 
The Beneish model assesses the possibility of earnings manipulation as it estimates the extent to which reported 
earnings deviates from the actual (Warshavsky, 2012). According to Warshavsky (2012) accounting 
manipulations include inter alia: 
Recording revenue too soon, not recognizing current expenses appropriately and improperly reducing liabilities. 
The Beneish model as attested to by Warshavsky (2012), is similar to the Altman model only that it does not 
predict bankruptcy. It is a model that seeks to unearth financial statement fraud. Firms that return a high Beneish 
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score are potential manipulators of their financial statements. 
 The Beneish model employs eight indices. According to Beneish et al. (1999) the indices have varying 
rationales as outlined below: 
Days Sales in Receivables Index (DSRI): This measures how accounts receivables as a percentage of sales have 
changed compared to the year before. It captures distortions in accounts receivables that originate from an 
inflation of revenue. 
(Accounts Receivable cy / Sales cy)  
(Accounts Receivable py /sales py) 
Note: The current year and previous year are respectively denoted cy and py 
Gross Margin Index (GMI): This compares the gross margin between the previous year and the current year. 
Deteriorating margins may predispose a firm to engage in financial statement fraud 
(Sales py – Cost of Sales py) /Sales py 
(Sales cy- Cost of Sales cy)/ Sales cy 
Asset Quality Index (AQI): The greater the AQI the higher the possibility of fraud. It captures manipulations in 
“other assets” which can be an indication of excessive capitalization of expenditure. 
1-(Current Assets cy + Property Plant & Equipment cy) / Total Assets cy 
1-(Current Assets py + Property Plant & Equipment py )/Total Assets py 
Sales Growth Index (SGI):  This index compares sales between two consecutive years. An increase in sales 
could mean the company is doing well. However, growth companies are more susceptible to earnings 
manipulation as they will want the perception of continuous growth maintained. 
Sales cy 
Sales py 
Depreciation Index (DEPI): This index indicates that growth in income as a result of declining depreciation 
could be a sign of earnings manipulation. 
Depreciation Expense py / (Depreciation Expense py + PPE py) 
Depreciation Expense cy / (Depreciation Expense cy + PPE cy) 
Sales, General and Administrative Expenses Index (SGAI): Higher sales and administrative expenses indicate a 
decrease in administrative efficiency and predispose firms to engage in financial statement fraud. 
Sales, General and Administrative Expenses cy /Sales cy 
Sales, General and Administrative Expenses py / Sales py 
Total Accruals to Total Assets Index (TATA): This index captures accounting profits which are not real and are 
not supported by profits at hand. High accruals at the time of decreasing cash could be an indication of revenue 
manipulation. 
(Change in Working capital) – (Change in Cash) + (Change in Current Tax Payable) + (Current Portion of Long 
Term Debt ) - Depreciation and Amortization Expense_______________________________________ 
                                       Total Assets 
Leverage Index (LVGI): Increasing leverage could make a firm prone to earnings manipulation. 
(Long Term Debt cy + Current Liabilities cy ) / Total Assets cy 
(Long Term Debt py + Current Liabilities py )/ Total Assets py 
The above indices were then applied to the function M= -4.84 + (0.92*DSRI) + (0.528 * GMI) + (0.404 *AQI) + 
(0.892* SGI) + (0.115 * DEPI) – (0.172 * SGAI) + (4.679* TATA) - (0.327 * LVGI) to calculate the MSCORE 
for AGA between the years 2010 to 2012. 
According to Beneish (1999), an MSCORE greater than -2.22 should trigger the suspicion that the company is 
involved in financial statement fraud. Beneish (1999) contends that the probability of earnings manipulation 
becomes high when there is an unusual increase in receivables, declining asset quality, growth in sales and 
accruals. Beneish (1999) sampled two broad categories of firms and classified them as manipulators and non-
manipulators. The mean for the various predictive indices for both categories are as enumerated in the last 2 
columns of table 3. If any of AngloGold Ashanti’s indices exceeded the mean for manipulators that should call 
for greater scrutiny. 
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Indices for Non-Manipulators and Mani
INDEX 
 
Days Sales in Receivables (DSRI) 
Gross Margin (GMI) 
Asset Quality (AQI) 
Sales Growth (SGI) 
Depreciation (DEPI) 
Sales, General and Administrative (SGAI)
Total Accruals to Total Assets (TATA)
Leverage (LVGI) 
 
MSCORE 
 
 
3.0 Analysis of the Facts and Issues
3.1 Are There Potential Bankruptcy Signals At AngloGold Ashanti?
Altman (2000) postulates that, non-
safe from the possibility of bankruptcy. The Z” scores of AGA for the years 2010 to 2012 were respectively 0.20, 
2.61 and 1.41. 2011 aside, AGA was in financial distress in all the years under review. The unfavorable Altman 
scores were mainly derived from the negative retained earnings the firm recorded between 2010 and 2012. It 
could be interpreted that it paid more money than it earned. The Z scores were not in a consistent downward 
trend and therefore even though the scores were lower than the
be safely predicted. 
3.2 Probability of Earnings Manipulation
DPRI increased progressively from 2010 to 2013. This indicates that accounts receivables as a percentage of 
sales increased accordingly. The manipulators mean of 1.465 was greater than all the three years under review. 
GMI: Between 2011 and 2012, AGA’s Gross Margin deteriorated. However, GMI for all three years under 
review were lower than the manipulators mean.
AQI: In general when AQI is grea
Ashanti’s AQI for the three years never crossed the manipulators mean of 1.254.
SGI was greater than 1.0 or close to it between 2010 and 2012.
AngloGold’s score for DEPI, SGAI, TAT
time or the other within the years under review as depicted by the graph below. 
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pulating firms 
 2010 2011 2012 Non-Manipulators
0.914 1.150 1.389 1.031 
0.758 0.837 1.108 1.041 
1.041 0.930 1.173 1.039 
1.416 1.232 0.967 1.134 
0.916 0.967 1.147 1.001 
 1.009 1.026 1.083 1.054 
 0.139 (0.140) (0.085) 0.018 
0.322 1.840 1.173 1.037 
-1.44 -3.19 -2.48 - 
 
 
manufacturing firms that have a Z” score of more than 2.6 are 
 benchmark in 2010 and 2012, bankruptcy cannot 
 
 
ter than 1.0, it signifies a reduction in asset quality. However, AngloGold 
 
 
A and LVGI were higher for the manipulators mean at one point in 
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 Manipulators 
1.465 
1.193 
1.254 
1.607 
1.077 
1.041 
0.031 
1.111 
- 
considered 
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However the overall M Score was only greater than the benchmark of -2.22 in 2010. In 2011 and 2012, AGA 
recorded M Scores that were all lower than the Beneish benchmark. This signifies that overall, AGA was not 
manipulating earnings in the years under review. 
 
4.0 Conclusion and Recommendation 
Beasley et al. (2000), Beasley (1996) and Dunn (2004) make the observation that there is a tendency for firms 
engaged in fraud to engage fewer external members on their board. The motivation is clear: internal officers 
appointed to boards are more malleable. Beasley et al.(2000) also make the observation that the incidence of 
fraud is relatively more widespread among companies not having an audit committee. The larger the audit 
committee, as observed by Beasley et al. (2000), the lower the incidence of fraud. This buttresses the point made 
by Dunn (1999) of the importance of internal controls. 
The need for checks and balances in organizations and decentralization of power is underscored by Robinson 
(2002) who identified a negative relation between the independence of audit committee members1 and the 
incidence of fraud. Centralization of power and decision making as outlined by Dunn (2004) may provide an 
opportunity or incentive to commit financial statement fraud. Chief Executive Officers as enumerated by 
Dechow et al. (1996) could have the tendency of centralizing power which Dunn (2004) observes can incentivize 
executives to engage in fraud. According to Cressey (1953), an executive who engages in fraud only gets 
himself/herself in the act because the opportunity to perpetrate fraud was made available. 
The incentives in engaging in fraud and the benefits it presents as was in the case of Enron are momentary. 
Bankruptcy and fraud prediction models such as those postulated by Altman (1968) and Beneish (1999) help 
potential investors to stay away from fraud companies. There has also been the promulgation of many laws in 
many jurisdictions including Ghana that seek to prevent fraud. However, the practice will only stop when 
executives report financial statements ethically and choose to desist from engaging in the practice entirely. 
Auditors should work with the conviction of uncovering fraud. As attested to by Bonner et al. (1998), failure to 
detect fraud has proven costly not only to the fraud companies involved but also to auditing firms as well. Future 
of audit practice depends on the ability of auditors to detect fraud (Wilks & Zibelman, 2004). To achieve results 
in detecting and deterring corporate fraud, the way to proceed is for firms to employ teams of auditors instead of 
individuals. Hill (1982) and Miner (1984) report that team judgments are often times superior to those of 
individual auditors. Corporate organizational structures should have a mesh of management, boards of directors 
and audit committees who should all work in unison in the fiscal process to detect and prevent fraud. When 
internal controls are tight and there is a fair degree of oversight in place, there will be a disincentive to engage in 
financial statement fraud.  
The Center for Audit Quality (CAQ) outlines three mechanisms to prevent fraud. According to CAQ (2010), 
management should not only build an ethical culture but uphold it. Employees will then be bound to follow suit. 
CAQ (2010) also suggests that financial statements should be analyzed by external users (especially creditors 
and investors) with a dose of skepticism. This will increase the perception amongst corporate executives that if 
they start a fraud scheme it will be detected. Communication is also essential in the fight against corporate fraud. 
As CAQ (2010) points out, if corporate executives exchange information, inconsistencies in financial reporting 
will be brought to the fore, and the opportunity to engage in financial statement fraud will be curbed. 
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